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Abstract 
This meta-analysis examined the efficacy of interventions aimed at reducing automatic gender 
stereotypes. Such interventions included attentional distraction, salience of within-category 
heterogeneity, and stereotype suppression. A small but significant main effect (g = .32) 
suggests that interventions are successful, but their scope is limited. The intervention main 
effect was moderated by publication status, sample nationality, and type of intervention. The 
meta-analytic findings speak to several issues worthy of further investigation, such as whether 
(a) other categories of intervention not yet identified or tested could be more effective, (b) 
suppression necessarily produces ironic effects in automatic stereotyping, (c) different 
indirect measures are differentially sensitive to stereotype change, and (d) automatic 
stereotypes about men differ in their malleability from those about women. 
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A Meta-Analysis on the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes 
Gender is one of the most – if not the most – biologically primitive and important social 
categories (Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001). This would explain why it is the first social 
category that humans are able to discriminate (as early as nine months of age; Leinbach & 
Fagot, 1993) and, consequently, why gender-related stereotypes are among the first 
stereotypes that humans develop (as early as age two; Hill & Flom, 2007). Furthermore, men 
and women are complementary in a way that is unlike most other contrasting social categories 
(e.g., unlike black vs. white ethnic groups; Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001a). This between-group 
complementarity contributes to the maintenance of gender inequality, given that the distinct 
roles are perceived by many to be both natural and fair (Jost & Kay, 2005). Given their 
cultural embeddedness and seeming innateness, gender stereotypes can be particularly 
pernicious. To the extent that gender stereotypes impede men and women’s progress or 
artificially limit their choices, it is important to understand if and how they might be 
counteracted. To that end, the present meta-analysis examines the efficacy of interventions 
aimed at reducing automatic gender stereotypes. 
We focus on automatic stereotypes, because dual-system models of mental 
representation (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 1999) typically 
argue that automatic (vs. controlled) processes are relatively more resistant to change.
1 
Nevertheless, social psychological evidence for the malleability of automatic intergroup 
attitudes more generally has been accumulating in the past 10 or so years (see Blair, 2002, for 
a review). For example, and with respect to gender, Blair, Ma, and Lenton (2001) reported 
that imagining a strong woman led to weaker automatic gender stereotypes than imagining a 
Caribbean vacation. Similarly, participants in another study (Steffens, Günster, & Hoffmann, 
2005) were instructed to consider potential job applicants who were either 
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communal female or an agentic male). Participants in the former condition showed weaker 
automatic gender stereotypes as compared to those in the latter condition. 
But what counts as change? Recently, Gregg, Seibt, and Banaji (2006) argued that 
researchers need to consider this continuum more carefully. For example, for interventions 
aimed at reducing automatic stereotypes to be considered truly effective, by how much should 
they reduce stereotypes? To reach this conceptual clarification, it would be helpful for 
researchers to know the degree of malleability of automatic stereotypes that has been 
empirically observed in intervention studies. Accordingly, we assessed meta-analytically the 
overall success of attempts to reduce automatic gender stereotypes. Indeed, providing an 
estimate of the mean success of attempts to reduce automatic gender stereotypes was the main 
goal of this meta-analysis; the search for moderators was another. 
Before addressing these goals statistically, we first describe the conceptualization of 
stereotypes to which we adhere. In accordance with connectionist models (Smith & Conrey, 
2007; Smith & DeCoster, 1998, 1999), we understand stereotypes as “‘states’ not ‘things’” 
(Smith & Conrey, 2007, p. 247). On the basis of this view, it might be construed as 
misleading for us to suggest that a stereotype could be ‘reduced,’ because this suggestion 
seems to imply that stereotypes are stable internal structures. Instead, connectionist models 
propose that stereotypes are quite elastic and, thus, any individual could hold an infinite 
number of representations of a social category’s members, when viewed across time and 
place. This is because a stereotype is a pattern of activation that – at a given point in time – is 
jointly determined by current input (i.e., the context) and the connection weights of the 
underlying network. These weights are incrementally updated over extended periods of time, 
as the individual encounters stimuli; updating of the connection weights is equivalent to 
learning. Thus, stereotypes are not static notions that people carry around in their heads no 
matter where they go; instead, the exact form that a stereotype takes depends both on people’s 
prior experience and on the judgment context in which they find themselves. For example, a On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     5      
 
person’s stereotype of ‘women’ will likely differ if she is attending a conference alongside the 
top 100 businesswomen in the world, as compared to if she is visiting a friend in the maternity 
ward of the local hospital. Consequently, when we suggest that there may be interventions 
that can successfully ‘reduce’ automatic stereotypes, we mean to imply that these 
interventions – as (part of) current input – may produce an output pattern that is less 
consistent with traditional gender stereotypes than the pattern of activation that would emerge 
with more standard (stereotype-consistent or stereotype-irrelevant) input. In other words, 
asking people to imagine a ‘strong woman’ prior to completing a measure of implicit gender 
stereotypes is likely to yield a less traditional stereotype than asking people to imagine a 
‘weak woman’ or a ‘Caribbean vacation’ (Blair et al., 2001).  
In light of the above, we make no strong theoretical claims about the longevity of the 
impact of any stereotype-reduction intervention, except to say that the intervention would 
likely lead to updating of the connection weights. Because learning is a slow process, 
however, a single experience with a stereotype-reduction intervention is unlikely to change 
the connection weights to any substantial degree. Given that the vast majority of primary 
studies investigates stereotype change within single experimental sessions and without 
repeated interventions, our meta-analysis should be viewed as examining malleability in 
current output activation patterns rather than in underlying connection weights. 
Returning to the aims of this meta-analysis, in addition to providing an empirical effect 
size estimate of the relative power of stereotype-reduction interventions or, conversely, the 
relative inflexibility and resistance of automatic stereotypes to such interventions (Gregg et 
al., 2006, Studies 3-4), this meta-analysis may help to refine theorizing about automaticity 
and stereotyping more generally. The overall results will offer an indication of the general 
degree to which current input can – at least in the short-term – over-ride the default pattern of 
activation built up by the slow-learning system (Smith & Conrey, 2007; Smith & DeCoster, 
1999). Again, connectionist models argue that output is a combination of both current input On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     6      
 
and the underlying connection weights, implying that the effects of a single instantiation of a 
stereotype-reduction intervention would be moderate at best. Our meta-analysis will provide a 
first quantification of the size of this effect.  
Cooper (1989) suggests that research reviews attempt to achieve two major goals: (a) to 
“present the state of knowledge” concerning the phenomenon of interest, and (b) to “highlight 
important issues that research has left unresolved” (p. 13). Similarly, Eagly and Wood (1994) 
maintain that a meta-analysis can be particularly useful at the middle stage of a field’s 
investigation, with further collection of primary data being followed up by another meta-
analysis – the idea being to develop increasingly adequate answers to research questions. We 
believe that research into the malleability of automatic gender stereotypes and its moderators 
has reached this middle stage and a meta-analysis is therefore timely and useful. Accordingly, 
the present meta-analysis emphasizes both aims described by Cooper: It summarizes the 
evidence on the malleability of automatic gender stereotypes and, through an identification of 
moderators, highlights research questions that future primary studies may need to address.  
Potential Moderators of the Effectiveness of Gender Stereotype-Reduction Interventions 
We investigated seven potential moderators. The first three of these (i.e., intervention 
method, intervention specificity, type of indirect measure) describe the nature of the 
intervention or the automatic stereotyping measure used, and therefore have theoretical 
implications for models of automatic stereotyping. The remaining four moderators (i.e., 
nationality of sample, gender composition of sample, publication status, sex of first author) 
refer to sample characteristics and publication features.  
Intervention method. Researchers have examined the utility of a variety of interventions 
for changing automatic attitudes. These interventions range from manipulating experimenter 
race (Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001) to instructing participants to see the world through 
the eyes of an elderly man (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). In an attempt to organize this 
literature, Blair (2002) proposed five intervention categories: (a) Motivation (personal or On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     7      
 
social); (b) Stereotype reduction strategies; (c) Attentional focus; (d) Context cues; and (e) 
Characteristics of the target(s). However, as Table 1 shows, research on interventions that aim 
to reduce automatic gender stereotypes does not represent all five categories. Thus, we offer 
what we hope will be a productive alternative to intervention classification in the domain of 
automatic gender stereotypes. 
In particular, we assigned each intervention to one of three categories (see Table 2 for a 
summary of these intervention methods). The first, or our own category ‘A’ interventions, 
distracts or redirects perceivers’ attention prior to category activation. The rationale behind 
this intervention-category is that a low level of engagement with the stimulus-category would 
lead to little – if any – stereotype activation as compared to a higher level of engagement with 
the stimulus category. For example, in the context of a lexical decision task, participants in 
one study were shown digitized photos of women and household objects, some of which 
contained a white dot. The participants then either had to detect the dot’s presence or to 
decide whether the photograph contained an animate versus inanimate object (Macrae, 
Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, & Castelli, 1997). Those searching for the white dot supposedly 
had a lower level of engagement with the category-stimulus (as compared to those judging 
whether the target was animate or not) and, thus, they should be less likely to show gender 
stereotype activation in the subsequent implicit gender stereotyping task. 
The second intervention-type, or category ‘B’ interventions, depends upon the existence 
of heterogeneity within the activated stereotype. Our research (Lenton, Sedikides, & Bruder, 
2008) shows that representations of social categories can contain both stereotype-consistent 
and stereotype-inconsistent information at the same time. Interventions in this category may 
activate the representation, but emphasize a particular stereotype-inconsistent aspect of it.  For 
example, before they completed a gender/leadership IAT, participants in one study were given 
descriptions of either successful businesswomen or the origin and use of flowers (Dasgupta & 
Asgari, 2004). So although participants’ general representation might consist of relatively On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     8      
 
more stereotype-consistent depictions of women, the current input – ‘successful 
businesswomen’ – brings the stereotype-inconsistent depictions to the fore. 
The third type, or intervention category ‘C,’ is intended to prevent or inhibit stereotype 
expression, but not necessarily stereotype activation. For example, one experiment first 
trained participants to either say ‘yes’ when they were presented with gender-stereotypical 
combinations of photos and words (e.g., a male photo paired with a male stereotype-
consistent word) or to respond with ‘no’ when they were presented with such combinations; 
following this, they completed a gender priming task (Boccato, Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2006). 
As a result of this training, participants tried to suppress their general gender stereotypes 
when they encountered the subsequent priming task. 
To summarize, category ‘A’ interventions preclude or interfere with initial category 
and, thus, stereotype activation. Category ‘B’ and ‘C’ interventions, on the other hand, permit 
the category/stereotype to become activated and potentially guide further judgment. Category 
‘B’ and ‘C’ interventions are distinct from one another, however, in terms of their focus of 
attention: Category ‘B’ interventions direct perceivers’ attention toward a particular aspect of 
the stereotype (i.e., the counterstereotypical aspect or subtype), whereas category ‘C’ 
interventions activate the stereotype broadly, focusing perceivers’ attention only on 
prevention or inhibition of its expression. With respect to Blair’s (2002) classification 
scheme, ‘A’ is similar to her ‘focus of attention’ category, whereas both ‘B’ and ‘C’ fall under 
stereotype reduction strategies. However, given that ‘B’ and ‘C’ are distinct in terms of both 
process and potential outcome (see below), we believe that there is value in considering them 
separately. Impression formation and person perception models (Brewer & Feinstein, 1999; 
Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999) – in which category activation and attention constitute crucial 
and independent influences – support the distinctions we and Blair have made, as does 
research indicating that interventions that make the general category active (e.g., stereotype 
suppression) can produce ironic effects (i.e., the unintended consequence of increasing – On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     9      
 
rather than decreasing – subsequent stereotype activation; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & 
Jetten, 1994). Our meta-analysis, then, examines the relative effectiveness of these three 
intervention categories. We expect that, if any intervention category results in the temporary 
reversal of automatic gender stereotypes (as opposed to their temporary reduction or 
elimination), it would be category ‘B’ interventions, as their current input is more likely than 
either category ‘A’ or ‘C’ interventions to activate counterstereotypical subtypes (e.g., a 
strong woman). 
Intervention specificity. Whereas some studies have sought to reduce automatic gender 
stereotypes in general (Blair & Banaji, 1996), others have focused exclusively on changing 
stereotypes about women (Dasgupta & Asgari, 2004).
2 In this meta-analysis, we tested 
whether the specificity of the intervention – i.e., whether it focuses on stereotypes about 
women exclusively – matters. Norm theory (Kahneman and Miller, 1986; Miller, Taylor, & 
Buck, 1991) suggests that, because men are perceived to be the normative gender and women 
are perceived to be the deviations in need of explanation, interventions targeted specifically at 
changing beliefs about women only may be more effective than those targeted at changing 
beliefs about men only. In support of this view, research indicates that stereotypes of women 
(vs. men) are perceived to have changed more during the last 50 years, and are expected to 
change even more in the next 50 years (Diekman & Eagly, 2000). Accordingly, we expected 
that interventions attempting to change beliefs about both men and women simultaneously 
would be less effective than those attempting to change beliefs about women only. As an 
example of simultaneous belief-change interventions, participants in one study were 
instructed to expect a male name following a stereotypically-feminine trait and a female name 
following a stereotypically-masculine trait (Blair & Banaji, 1996). As an example of women-
only belief change interventions, in another study participants heard an aversive noise only 
after being presented with a negative female stereotypic word-pair, such as female-weak On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     10      
 
(Nodera & Karasawa, 2005). Note that no studies attempted to change stereotypes about men 
only (for more on this finding, see Discussion). 
Type of indirect measure. Stereotyping measures are typically categorized as either 
explicit/direct or implicit/indirect, with little distinction made within each category. There is 
reason to believe, however, that indirect measures are not interchangeable. For example, 
debate surrounds the validity of Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz’s (1998) Implicit 
Association Test (IAT; Blanton, Jaccard, Gonzales, & Christie, 2006, 2007; Fiedler, Messner, 
& Bluemke, 2006; Nosek & Sriram, 2007). Indeed, the Go/No-Go Association Task (GNAT; 
Nosek & Banaji, 2001) was developed in response to one of the supposed shortfalls of the 
IAT, namely its inability to distinguish attitudes toward the group of interest versus attitudes 
toward a contrasting group. Additionally, research shows that apparently similar measures 
(e.g., lexical decision vs. conceptual priming) produce different results, with each having a 
unique relationship to explicit measures of the (supposedly) same construct (Wittenbrink, 
Judd, & Park, 2001). Still other research indicates that some indirect attitude measures are 
positively correlated (Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001) and, thus, must assess the same 
construct to some degree. Therefore, in this meta-analysis, we examine whether the effect of 
gender stereotype reduction interventions depends on the type of indirect measure employed. 
Nationality of sample. Johnson and Eagly (2000) recommended that meta-analyses 
investigate, for generalizability purposes, the stability of effect size estimates across 
geographic regions. Furthermore, research suggests that cultures vary in the extent to which 
they endorse gender stereotypes (Glick et al., 2000, 2004). It follows that stereotype-reduction 
interventions may be differentially effective across cultures. 
Gender composition of sample. The majority of experimental psychology research relies 
on University convenience samples (e.g., introductory psychology students; Peterson, 2001; 
Sears, 1986). Female participants make up over half of these samples. Thus, research on 
automatic gender stereotypes may reflect better women’s than men’s gender-related On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     11      
 
representations. For example, Blair et al. (2001, Study 4) found that counterstereotype mental 
imagery reduced automatic gender stereotyping only among female participants. These 
findings, together with research indicating that men are more likely than women to hold 
negative beliefs about women (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001b), bolster the utility of 
investigating whether the success of interventions to reduce automatic gender stereotypes 
depends on a participant’s gender. 
Publication status. A thorough and conservatively approached meta-analysis includes 
both published and unpublished studies so as not to inflate the average effect size (Johnson & 
Eagly, 2000). Such inflation may result from what Rosenthal (1979) called the file-drawer 
problem, where only significant findings tend to be published. We tested whether the file-
drawer problem can account for effects of stereotype-reduction interventions.  
Sex of first author. In a meta-analysis on sex differences in influenceability, Eagly and 
Carli (1981) reported that the size of the effect depended on author sex, such that male 
authors uncovered larger sex differences than did female authors. This finding has been 
interpreted as indicating that researchers tend to find or report results that are favorable to 
their own sex (Eagly & Wood, 1994; but see Hedges & Becker, 1986). To test for this 
possibility, we investigated the role of author sex in effect size magnitude.  
Overview and Hypotheses 
We conducted a meta-analysis of studies that focused on the reduction of automatic 
gender stereotypes. Our goal was to provide the first cumulative test of the potency of 
stereotype-reduction interventions or, conversely, the rigidity of automatic stereotypes. In 
view of connectionist models of mental representations, we expected that these interventions 
– as current input – would have a significant reductive effect on automatic stereotype output. 
However, this effect would be moderate at best, given that existing connection weights also 
contribute to automatic stereotype output. On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     12      
 
Furthermore, we sought to identify factors that moderate the effectiveness of such 
interventions. Based on previous theorizing and empirical results, we expected suppression-
type interventions to be the least effective route to stereotype change. It was not clear, 
however, whether interventions involving attentional distraction or salience of heterogeneity 
would prove superior to the other. We also expected that interventions attempting to change 
beliefs about both men and women simultaneously would be less effective than those 
attempting to change beliefs about women only. Although we examined the impact of the 
type of indirect measure on automatic stereotype change, we did not have strong a priori 
hypotheses regarding which ones would be most or least sensitive, as researchers’ 
understanding of the processing underlying them remains limited. The present research may 
help fill this knowledge gap.  Investigation of the role of sample nationality in the effects of 
stereotype-reduction interventions on automatic gender stereotypes was also exploratory, so 
our hypothesis here remained open. Given the predominance of female participants in most 
research on automatic gender stereotype change and the finding that, on average, men possess 
stronger and more negative stereotypes about women than women do, we expected that 
stereotype interventions would be more effective among women than among men. We 
anticipated that the effect size of unpublished studies would be lower than that of published 
studies, but that the file drawer problem would likely not fully account for the effect of 
stereotype-reduction interventions on automatic gender stereotypes. Finally, our investigation 
of the role of sex of first author was exploratory: It was not clear what finding would be 
considered complimentary to the respective authors’ gender group. 
Method 
Inclusion Criteria 
To be included in our meta-analysis, a study needed to: 
1.  Investigate stereotypes (i.e., conceptual associations) rather than prejudice or 
discrimination (Fiske, 1998). On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     13      
 
2.  Reflect conceptions about men and/or women in general, rather than conceptions 
about male or female subgroups (e.g., elderly men). 
3.  Use an indirect measure of automatic gender stereotypes, where “indirect” was 
defined per Blair’s (2002) conceptualization of automaticity. 
4.  Focus on the malleability and, in particular, on the potential reduction of automatic 
gender stereotypes rather than on the general activation or even exacerbation of 
these stereotypes. 
Literature Search 
Database search. We searched the literature at the start of this project and again in 
November, 2007 (near the close of the project). As a first step in both searches, we submitted 
a combination of search terms to relevant online databases (PsycINFO, ISI Web of 
Knowledge, ERIC). A study needed to be located by all four search terms (corresponding to 
our four inclusion criteria) in order for it to be incorporated in the initial sample of studies for 
which titles and abstracts were screened: 
1.  (stereotyp* OR attitud* OR prejud*) to locate stereotype-related research 
(allowing for imprecise categorizations by primary authors). 
2.  (gender OR men OR women OR masculin* OR feminin* OR male OR female OR 
sex) to limit the results to gender-related studies. 
3.  (implicit OR automatic* OR indirect OR unconscious* OR nonconscious*) to 
locate studies investigating automatic processes. 
4.  (malleab* OR chang* OR influenc* OR moderat* OR reduc* OR increas*) to 
locate studies focusing on change.
3 
As an additional search criterion, we only considered studies published from 1989 
onwards, because the assessment of automatic stereotypes became a major research endeavor 
in the 1990s, following the distinction between implicit and explicit racial attitudes (Devine, 
1989). In our search of November, 2007, 549 PsycINFO entries met all four search criteria. On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     14      
 
This initial search, however, failed to identify a few relevant articles that we had gleaned 
informally from social psychological journals. Thus, we conducted a second search that 
relaxed the second criterion (gender), although, in order to keep results manageable, we only 
used the term stereotyp* (and not attitud* OR prejud*) to satisfy our first criterion. This 
search resulted in 399 PsycINFO hits. We examined the titles and abstracts of all 798 
publications (excluding duplicates) in order to identify studies that fulfilled our inclusion 
criteria. 
Backward and forward search. After the database search, we conducted a backward 
search using the reference sections of all acceptable articles, as well as the reference list of a 
narrative review on the malleability of automatic stereotypes and prejudice (Blair, 2002). 
Next, we carried out a forward search of PsycINFO and the Web of Knowledge in order to 
find studies that had since cited the identified papers or relevant references in the Blair (2002) 
article.  
E-Mail requests for support. The final step involved e-mailing (a) all first authors of 
relevant articles to inquire of additional studies they might have conducted, and (b) authors of 
articles that met most, but not all, of our inclusion criteria to make a final determination 
regarding their relevance and to uncover unpublished work. We also requested relevant 
studies from the e-mail lists of the Society of Personality and Social Psychology, the 
European Association of Experimental Social Psychology, and the social psychology section 
of the German Psychological Society. 
Sample Characteristics and Recorded Variables 
The final sample consisted of 13 research reports containing 21 independent effect 
sizes. For each effect size, we recorded the following features: (a) its publication status; (b) 
the nationality of the sample; (c) whether the male, the female, or both stereotypes were 
targeted by the intervention (intervention specificity); (d) the percentage of male and female 
participants; (e) the sample size; and (f) whether the intervention reversed the stereotype (for On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     15      
 
while an effect size informs us if stereotyping is reduced or exacerbated, it does not by itself 
tell us whether an intervention effectively led to greater counterstereotyping than 
stereotyping). We also recorded the indirect dependent measure used to assess stereotype 
activation and change. The most commonly used measures were the IAT, the GNAT, 
sequential priming tasks (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995), and lexical decision 
tasks (LDTs; Macrae et al., 1994). Lastly, both the first and second author independently 
coded the type of intervention used. In particular, we differentiated among three intervention 
categories (see Table 2). The two raters initially agreed on 18 of the 21 categorizations. The 
categorizations for the three remaining effect sizes were resolved through discussion among 
the three authors of this article (a study corresponding to one of these 3 effect sizes was 
deemed uncategorizable with respect to our intervention classifications; see Table 1).  
Effect Size Calculation 
We used Hedges’ g to assess effect size. In this measure, the mean difference between 
two groups is standardized by dividing it by the pooled standard deviation computed from 
both groups (as an estimate of the population SD). Because our sample included a subset of 
all possible interventions designed to influence automatic attitudes (Blair, 2002) and we 
intended to ensure maximum generalizability of the findings, we used a random effects model 
in the overall integration of effect sizes and the examination of moderators (Hedges & Vevea, 
1998). However, in order to represent more accurately the mean overall effect of our sample 
of studies, we also present the results of a fixed effects analysis. In all analyses, studies were 
weighted by the reciprocal of their variance (Hedges, 1994). We computed effect sizes and 
variance measures drawing largely on advice by Johnson and Eagly (2000) and DeCoster 
(2004). We used David Wilson’s (2002) SPSS macros to compute the overall effect and to 
examine the impact of moderator variables. 
Results 
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The sample of independent studies included in the meta-analysis was k = 21, with total 
N = 1,646 participants. The mean sample size was n = 78.38 with a median sample of n = 70 
participants. Eighteen of the 21 studies showed an effect of the intervention in the expected 
direction, such that the group exposed to the stereotype-reduction intervention showed less 
automatic stereotyping than its respective control group. Eight of these effects were 
significant at α = .05 (Table 1). Three studies revealed increased stereotyping in the 
intervention condition, with one of these effects reaching statistical significance. All but one 
study (which was based on a community sample; Dasgupta & Asgari, 2004, Study 1) relied 
upon university students. 
Outlier Detection 
Prior to further analysis, we screened the data for possible outliers, using Huffcutt and 
Arthur’s (1995) sample-adjusted meta-analytic deviancy (SAMD) statistic. The scree plot of 
the absolute value of the SAMD statistics (Figure 1) revealed that two studies lay well above 
an imaginary line drawn through the values of the remaining studies; thus, the effect sizes 
observed by Blair and Banaji (1996, Study 3), SAMD = 5.10, and Häcker, Meyer, and Quinn 
(2007), SAMD = 4.97, were deemed positive and negative outliers, respectively. One strategy 
for dealing with outliers is to exclude them from the meta-analysis. Alternatively, discrepant 
study effect sizes can be Windsorized and assigned a somewhat less extreme value (Lipsey & 
Wilson, 2001, p. 108). In order to be able to include these studies, we adjusted the two 
outlying effect sizes. To retain their relative extreme position, we assigned to them the value 
of the effect size of the next extreme study plus 0.5 standard deviations of the study sample 
(SD/2 = .22). For Blair and Banaji (1996) this meant adjusting the effect size from g = 1.53 to 
g’ = 1.20 for all further analyses. The effect size observed by Häcker, Meyer, and Quinn 
(2007) was adjusted accordingly from g = -.98 to g’ = -.42. These adjustments lowered the 
SAMD statistics of the outlying effect sizes to 3.70 and 2.84, bringing them within an 
acceptable range.
4 On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     17      
 
Overall Effect of Interventions to Reduce Implicit Gender Stereotyping 
The overall weighted mean effect was gRE = .32 in the random effects analysis and 
gFE = .30 in the fixed effects analysis, with a weighted standard deviation of .34. Both values 
were significant at p < .0001 (observed power > .9999) with 95% confidence intervals ranging 
from .18 to .46 for the random effects and from .21 to .38 for the fixed effects model. The 
observed range of effect sizes was -.20 ≤ g ≤ .98, not including the two outliers. Of the 20 
studies for which it was possible to determine whether an intervention led to a reversal in 
stereotyping (i.e., the intervention evoked greater counterstereotyping than stereotyping) only 
four did so (Dasgupta & Asgari, 2004, Studies 1 and 2; Macrae et al., 1997, Studies 1 and 2). 
None of these reversals was statistically significant. As Table 1 indicates, two of the studies 
relied upon distraction interventions, and two relied upon exposure to within-category 
heterogeneity. Note that the study by Liberman and Förster (2000) could not be included in 
the count, because these authors did not measure counterstereotype activation. 
Fail safe numbers were calculated per Rosenberg (2005). In a fixed-effects model, the 
number of studies with null results (and a mean n equal to the present sample) that would be 
needed to reduce the overall effect to nonsignificance (p > .05) is 280.
5 Even a relatively large 
number of unpublished null findings would therefore not threaten the overall main effect 
showing that interventions aimed at reducing automatic gender stereotypes have, on average, 
been successful. However, there was significant heterogeneity in the sample of effect sizes, 
Q = 45.95, p = .0008, suggesting the presence of moderators. 
Moderator Analysis 
Table 3 summarizes the results pertaining to moderators. Publication status, sample 
nationality, and type of intervention emerged as significant predictors of between-study 
heterogeneity, with no significant heterogeneity left within the respective groups. Published 
studies yielded a larger average effect size than unpublished studies, with the latter effect size 
being no different from zero. In addition, studies conducted with US respondents yielded a On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     18      
 
larger average effect size than those conducted with European respondents, and again the 
latter effect was no different from zero. We found no support for a moderating effect of first-
author sex or intervention specificity. 
With respect to the type of intervention, those relying on attentional distraction or on 
increasing the salience of the heterogeneous nature of a gender stereotype (e.g., priming a 
counter-stereotypical trait) had effect sizes significantly different from 0. Suppression 
interventions, on the other hand, did not differ from 0. Additionally, comparisons between the 
suppression and distraction, QB = 4.45, p = .035, and between the suppression and 
heterogeneity interventions, QB = 5.85, p = .016, showed that distraction and heterogeneity 
interventions were both more effective than suppression at reducing automatic gender 
stereotypes, but that the effects of distraction and heterogeneity interventions were not 
significantly different from each other, QB = .03, p = .855. Thus, manipulations involving 
either distraction or directed attention to a particular (diverse) aspect of the stereotype had 
significant reductive effects overall, and were reliably more powerful than those aiming at 
stereotype suppression. The latter, on average, had no effect one way or the other. 
The results for the type of indirect measure warrant additional attention. Although the 
nonsignificant omnibus test led us to abstain from conducting post hoc comparisons, the 
pattern of means and their associated significance levels nevertheless suggest that the GNAT, 
unlike the other indirect measures, may be impervious to or, perhaps, unable to detect change 
in automatic stereotypes. This null effect, however, is based on a very small sample and 
therefore potentially unstable. 
We used a weighted least squares (WLS) regression, estimated via the method of 
moments, to compute the association between percentage of female participants and the effect 
size measure (see Steel & Kammeyer-Mueller, 2002, for an advocacy of WLS regression in 
this context). The regression provided no evidence for a relationship between the sample’s 
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p = .666, R
2 = .01, β = .10. Thus, on the whole, these stereotype-reduction interventions were 
no more (or less) effective among women than among men. 
Finally, we found that two significant moderators (publication status and sample 
nationality) were confounded, χ
2 = 5.05, p = .025. Studies featuring US samples were more 
likely to be published than studies featuring European samples. We entered these predictors 
simultaneously into a WLS regression to investigate whether they exert independent effects 
on effect size (Hedges, 1994). The combined moderators explained considerable 
heterogeneity in our sample, QModel = 9.62, p = .008, R
2 = .33, whereas the individual beta-
weights were significant for publication status, β = .45, p = .048, and nonsignificant for 
sample nationality, β = .21, p = .362. Thus, publication status provides the larger contribution 
to variation in effect size.  
Discussion 
The results of our meta-analysis show that interventions aimed at reducing automatic 
gender stereotypes have been successful overall, although the average effect size is small 
(Cohen,  1988). Automatic attitudes are indeed malleable and susceptible to some forms of 
single-session interventions (Blair, 2002). At the same time, however, the size of the effect 
indicates that interventions do not meet with unmitigated success. In particular, primary 
studies usually fail to reduce automatic stereotyping to zero, let alone give rise to reliable 
counterstereotypic responding (Gregg et al., 2006). Thus, for the reader who had hoped for a 
fast and simple way to change other people’s stereotypes about women and/or men, these 
findings represent both good and bad news. Still, it remains unclear whether there are 
substantial boundaries to the malleability of automatic responding or, more mundanely, 
whether researchers have not yet identified the most powerful means for automatic 
stereotyping reduction. Although our study sample did not contain interventions that 
manipulate participants’ motivations, it did include presumably potent interventions, such as 
distraction (minimal category activation) and exposure to counterstereotypical information. On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     20      
 
Thus, there is likely a limit on the degree to which automatic responding can be influenced by 
a single experience with a stereotype-reduction intervention.  
Both publication status and sample nationality significantly moderated the effect of 
interventions on automatic gender stereotypes, such that published studies had a larger 
average effect size than unpublished studies, and studies using US participants had a larger 
average effect size than those using European participants. There are several potential 
explanations for the latter finding. Perhaps gender stereotypes in these geographic regions are 
distinct in terms of their strength or content. Alternatively, currently available implicit 
measures – especially those relying on semantic priming – may not be as valid outside the 
United States, as most have been developed with respect to North Americans’ attitude and 
belief structures. It is also possible that particular interventions are more or less successful in 
one geographic region or another. Future research ought to investigate systematically the 
cross-cultural generalizability of implicit measures and stereotype-interventions.  
Publication status and sample nationality were correlated, however, and a subsequent 
multiple regression analysis revealed that publication status was the stronger predictor, with 
sample nationality falling to nonsignificance when controlling for publication status. 
Although these results indicate that small or nonsignificant effects are less likely to be 
published, they are not indicative of the worst-case file drawer problem, whereby the true 
effect size equals zero, but because only significant results are published, the believed effect 
size is greater than zero. This is because we determined that 280 nonsignificant effects would 
be needed to revise our conclusion that automatic stereotype-reduction interventions are at 
least somewhat successful. At the same time, however, our results indicate that consideration 
only of published studies would lead to an overestimation of the success of stereotype-
reduction interventions: The true success of these interventions is far more modest than the 
published studies would have us believe.  On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     21      
 
The findings also indicate that some methods may be more (or less) effective than 
others. In particular, explicitly advising people to ‘just say no’ (Boccato et al., 2006) or to 
suppress their gender stereotypes (Blair et al., 2001, Study 4) does not result in a reduced 
automatic stereotype effect. These findings are important, as such campaigns are arguably 
among the most public and common types of interventions aimed at reducing unequal 
treatment of people. Contrary to other research (Macrae et al., 1994), however, this particular 
intervention does not necessarily produce an ironic effect, whereby stereotypes are made more 
accessible following suppression (e.g., where someone might think even more about ‘women 
being homemakers’ after trying to suppress this particular stereotypic image). If we were to 
draw a strong conclusion, we might suggest that suppression – a strategy that relies heavily on 
controlled processing – is ineffective at reducing automatic stereotypes, perhaps because this 
strategy is intentional. For example, Blair et al. (2001) propose that counterstereotype mental 
imagery, while intentional, is an effective intervention not because of its intentionality, but 
because it has an effect at the implicit level (i.e., it constitutes a current input that alters the 
mental representation). A weaker, and probably more defensible conclusion, however, is that 
further research is required before we know for certain why suppression is an ineffective 
intervention for reducing automatic stereotypes.  
It is interesting to speculate on the observed lack of difference between the 
effectiveness of the distraction and heterogeneity stereotype reduction interventions. One 
possibility is that there are, as they say, many roads to Rome. So while the processes that 
mitigate automatic stereotyping in each intervention are unique, they are equally effective. 
From this perspective, we might advise equality campaigners either to (a) invent ways to 
distract individuals from processing information about a social category in an elaborate 
manner immediately prior to making a judgment about members of that category, or (b) 
instruct individuals to ‘think counterstereotypical thoughts’ about category members before 
making judgments about them. Obviously, both recommendations are impractical to some On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     22      
 
extent, with the former likely to be especially difficult to implement outside the laboratory. In 
any case, before we can make any concrete recommendations, it is necessary to point out that 
the automatic stereotyping measures were not randomly distributed across each type of 
intervention: Three out of the four distraction interventions were assessed with an LDT, and 
none of the heterogeneity interventions were assessed using this same measure. In fact, the 
method of measurement overlapped for just one study each (the GNAT; Blair et al., 2001; 
Nosek & Banaji, 2002). And when we compare the effect of (only) heterogeneity (i.e., not 
averaged with suppression: Hedges’ g = .07) to that of distraction on this measure (Hedges’ g 
= .27), we find the effect of the latter to be nearly four times that of the former, suggesting – 
perhaps – that distraction-type interventions may ultimately be more effective at reducing 
automatic stereotypes than those that try to make counterstereotypes salient.  
The findings also indicate that some methods of measuring stereotype change may be 
either less sensitive or, conversely, ‘more automatic’ than others. In particular, the GNAT, 
unlike the other measures, did not show any overall effect of stereotype-reduction 
interventions. One potential explanation is that the GNAT was the only measure in the 
analysis to control for a possible shift in participants’ response criterion, and this shift has 
been offered as an alternative explanation (vs. implicit associations) for the IAT effect 
(Brendl, Markman, & Messner, 2001). Blair et al.’s (2001) results contradict such an 
explanation, however, as one study (Study 5) used another measure that precludes the 
possibility of a response shift and it showed significantly reduced automatic gender 
stereotypes. A second unique feature of the GNAT is that it does not require the use of a 
contrasting category of a similar level of abstraction (Nosek & Banaji, 2001). Further 
inspection of the methodology of the two GNAT studies reveals, however, that both relied on 
the male contrasting category; thus, in practice, the GNAT was not so unique. Finally, 
research indicates that the internal consistency of the GNAT is low, both on average (r = .20, 
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the internal consistency of other implicit measures such as the IAT (Nosek, Greenwald, & 
Banaji, 2007). Thus, there may simply be too much noise contained within the GNAT itself, 
making it rather insensitive to current input. Despite this possibility and due to the small 
sample size of studies using the GNAT, further research is needed to determine if and how 
this measure is different in terms of its ability to pick up on or be resistant to stereotype 
malleability. 
Neither sex of author nor the sex composition of the sample contributed to variation in 
effect size. We can thus conclude that – at least in the domain of automatic gender stereotype 
malleability – there is no evidence that authors find or report results complimentary to their 
own sex. In addition, men were no more (or less) susceptible to influence attempts than were 
women, even if these groups possessed (on average) a different starting point in terms of their 
beliefs about women (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001b). This suggests that belief strength does not 
moderate the effectiveness of stereotype-reduction interventions, although more direct 
evidence relevant to this interpretation is needed. 
It also does not seem to matter whether the intervention aims to change only 
stereotypes about women or whether it aims to change gender stereotypes more generally: 
both intervention types were equally effective. However, at this stage, it is still not possible to 
determine conclusively whether the male and female stereotypes are equally susceptible to 
interventions, given the dearth of studies in which researchers have attempted to alter only the 
male stereotype. This finding in itself lends support to Miller et al.’s (1991) contention that 
men are perceived to be the normative category and women a deviation from this norm. We 
urge researchers to take up the challenge of seeking to determine whether male stereotypes 
(on their own) are just as susceptible to stereotype-reduction interventions as are female 
stereotypes (on their own) or gender stereotypes more generally. Not only would this research 
serve to ameliorate a possible bias in our field, but it may help explain why the male role is 
perceived to have changed less over the last 50 years (Diekman & Eagly, 2000), and it also On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     24      
 
may – albeit indirectly – provide support for our contention that the male stereotype is less 
heterogeneous than the female stereotype (Lenton, et al., 2008). Furthermore, given that men 
are, on average, liked less than are women (Eagly, Mladinic, & Otto, 1991; Rudman & 
Goodwin, 2004), it certainly seems there is ample scope for improving people’s beliefs about 
and expectations of men. 
Finally, our meta-analytic findings call attention to additional areas of research. There 
is a lack of studies investigating the duration of automatic gender stereotype change. Only one 
study in our sample (a quasi-experiment; Dasgupta & Asgari, 2004, Study 2) examined 
stereotype change beyond a single-session experiment. Again, connectionist models (Smith & 
Conrey, 2007; Smith & DeCoster, 1998, 1999) maintain that learning is a slow process and, 
as a result, a single experience with a stereotype-reduction intervention is unlikely to change 
the connection weights to any substantial degree, let alone for a lengthy period of time after 
the stereotype-reducing ‘current input’ is removed. Nevertheless, it remains an open question 
whether any change in automatic gender stereotypes persists beyond the immediate context of 
the intervention. Indeed, more research is needed on how motives (be it self-motives or 
social-motives; Blair, 2002; Sedikides & Strube, 1997) moderate automatic gender 
stereotypes. The results could well be different from those found with racial attitudes, because 
of the distinctly complementary nature of gender stereotypes (Eckes, 2001; Glick & Fiske, 
1996, 2001b). Finally, our study demonstrates that nearly all of this type of research has been 
conducted with University students. It is conceivable that older individuals’ stereotypes are 
less resistant to interventions such as those described in this paper, as single learning 
experiences will become less and less powerful over time (compared to prior learning, i.e., the 
existing connection weights). Of course, such a hypothesis would be difficult to examine 
cross-sectionally because of cohort effects; nevertheless, it is worthy of some consideration. 
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This meta-analysis demonstrates that interventions aimed at reducing automatic 
gender stereotypes have been successful on the whole, if not wholly successful, as these 
interventions were found to have a stable but small effect. The present findings also highlight 
several areas in need of additional research, including whether other categories of intervention 
could be more effective, if and when stereotype suppression results in ironic effects in 
automatic measures of stereotyping, if and how the GNAT is distinct from other indirect 
measures, and whether the male stereotype is as susceptible to reduction interventions as is 
the female stereotype, among others. In all, our meta-analysis provides a clear picture of what 
research into the malleability of implicit gender stereotypes has revealed thus far and a solid 
footing on which to base future research. 
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Footnotes 
1As Blair (2002) pointed out, a “hard-and-fast definition [of automaticity] is 
impractical” (p. 243) in light of researchers’ inability – theoretically or practically – to 
distinguish among the four common criteria: lack of awareness, lack of intention, lack of 
control, and efficiency (Bargh, 1994). For the purposes of the present article, we thus adopt 
Blair’s definition: An attitude (used in its tri-partite sense; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) is 
automatic to the extent that it is unintended, because the respondent is either unaware of the 
assessed construct or unable to implement a particular response strategy. 
2To our knowledge, there is no research focusing on the reduction of automatic 
stereotypes about men. 
3Following the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, we later included “context*” in 
this search term to also identify studies that investigated contextual effects on automatic 
gender stereotypes. This, however, did not result in the identification of any additional 
relevant effect sizes.
 
4The methods used by Blair and Banaji (1996) provide one clue as to this study’s 
unusually large effect: In addition to receiving different interventions, participants in the 
control and experimental conditions also encountered different stimulus material in the 
dependent measure. In particular, participants in the experimental (vs. control) condition were 
presented with more counterstereotypic prime-target pairs. Arguably, this enhanced the ease 
with which participants could implement their strategy.  
As indicated by our inability to assign Häcker, Meyer, and Quinn’s (2007) 
manipulation to an intervention-type, the nature and potential effect of the manipulation were 
somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, their manipulation of cognitive load (participants had 
to remember a 5-digit number) was similar in some respects to a distraction manipulation and, 
thus, might have contributed to reduced automatic gender stereotyping (per Gilbert & Hixon, 
1991). On the other hand, this distraction occurred during the encoding phase of a memory On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     36      
 
task (where participants read both gender stereotype-consistent and -inconsistent sentences) 
and, as such, the semantic processing of the material means that stereotypes could 
conceivably have become activated, leading to increased reliance on stereotypic knowledge in 
the recall phase. The results obviously suggest that the latter is likely to have been the case, 
but we based our inclusion of the study in this meta-analysis on theoretical, not empirical 
grounds. 
We also conducted all analyses without Windsorizing these two studies. The overall 
effects were virtually unchanged (gRE = .32, gFE = .29). The descriptive patterns for the 
moderator analyses were also highly similar and significant moderator effects were identified 
for the same variables (publication status, nationality of sample, type of intervention). The 
only difference was significant remaining within-group hetereogeneity in the moderator 
analysis on intervention specificity for those studies that attempted to change both stereotypes 
about men and women and in the moderator analysis of the type of indirect measure used for 
those studies employing priming procedures. 
5Rosenberg’s (2005) estimates of fail safe numbers are less conservative than 
Rosenthal’s (1979), which would suggest a fail safe number of 300 for the present analysis. 
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Table 1 
Characteristics of Studies Included in Meta-Analysis Testing the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes 
Publication, 
    Study no. 
Publication 
status 
Sex of 
first 
author 
Nationality 
of sample 
Intervention 
specificity 
Type of 
intervention 
Indirect 
measure 
Percentage 
of 
male/female 
participants 
Sample size  Effect size 
(Hedges’ g) 
SE of g 
Blair & Banaji 
(1996), 
journal female                 
    Study 3      US  both  heterogen.  priming  37/63  70   1.53
***c .27 
Blair, Ma, & Lenton 
(2001), 
journal female                 
    Study 1      US  female  heterogen.  IAT  40/60  39     .98
** .34 
    Study 2      US  female  heterogen.  IAT  32/68  79     .67
** .23 
    Study 4      US  female  heterogen./ 
suppress.
d 
GNAT  32/68  102     .01  .22 
    Study 5      US  female  heterogen.  DRM
e  28/72  127     .52
** .18 
Boccato, Corneille, 
& Yzerbyt (2006), 
unpublished male                 
    Study 1      Belgium  both  suppress.  priming  20/80  35     .21  .34 
    Study 2      Belgium  both  suppress.  priming  20/80  44     .15  .30 
Boccato, Corneille, 
Yzerbyt, & 
Wittenbrink (2007), 
unpublished male                 
    Study 3      Belgium  female  suppress.  priming  not available  48    -.05  .29 
Carpenter (2001),  unpublished  female                 
    Study 2      US  both  heterogen.  IAT  50/50  117     .43
* .19 
Dasgupta & Asgari 
(2004), 
journal female                 
    Study 1      US  female  heterogen.  IAT  0/100  72     .56
* .24 
    Study 2      US  female  heterogen.  IAT  0/100  52     .90
** .29 
Goodwin & Smoak 
(2007), 
unpublished female                 
    Study 1      US  both  heterogen.  IAT  60/40  88     .21  .21 On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     38      
 
Häcker, Meyer, & 
Quinn (2007), 
unpublished 
(conf. pres.) 
female                
    Study 1      UK  both  -
f cued 
recall 
25/75 61     -.98
***g .27 
Liberman, & Förster 
(2000) 
journal female                 
    Study 3      US  female  suppress.
d trait  term 
production
47/53 45     -.20  .32 
Macrae, 
Bodenhausen, Milne, 
Thorn, & Castelli 
(1997), 
journal male                 
    Study 1      UK  female  distract.  LDT  50/50  32     .64
† .36 
    Study 2      UK  female  distract.  LDT  0/100  32     .59  .36 
Nodera & Karasawa 
(2005), 
journal female  Japan              
    Study 1        female  distract.  LDT  100/0  50     .36  .29 
Nosek & Banaji 
(2002), 
unpublished 
(conf. pres.) 
male                
    Study 2      US  both  distract.  GNAT  50/50  74     .27  .23 
Steffens, Günster, & 
Hoffmann (2005), 
unpublished female                 
    Study 1      Germany  female  heterogen.  IAT  33/67  143     .05  .17 
    Study 2      Germany  female  heterogen.  IAT  23/77  192     .02  .14 
    Study 3      Germany  female  heterogen.  IAT  33/67  144     .37
* .17 
aHeterogen. = confrontation with heterogeneity within gender groups; suppress. = instruction to suppress stereotype expression; distract. = 
distraction or redirection of attention. 
bThe reported sample size might differ from the total sample size reported in the paper because (a) not all experimental groups were relevant to our 
analysis, (b) individual participants were not entered into the relevant analysis. 
cDue to its outlier status, this effect size was adjusted to g = 1.13 for all further analyses. On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     39      
 
dTwo dependent effect sizes were documented for this study. The average of these effects is reported here. 
eDRM = Deese-Roediger-McDermott false memory paradigm (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). 
fThis study used a cognitive load manipulation during the encoding phase of a memory task and, as such, it did not fit clearly into any of our 
categories. See footnote 3. 
gDue to its outlier status, this effect size was adjusted to g = -.42 for all further analyses. 
†p < .10. 
*p < .05. 
**p < .01. 
***p < .001. On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     40      
 
Table 2 
Characteristics of Examined Intervention Methods 
Intervention 
category 
                                   Process  Example 
 
A 
 
 
Inhibit stereotype activation 
 
 
 
Asking participants to focus on a white dot while they 
encounter stereotype-relevant material and before they 
complete an implicit measure of stereotypes. 
 
B 
 
 
 
Emphasize stereotype heterogeneity by 
activating stereotype-inconsistent 
aspects of the category representation 
 
Instructing participants to imagine a strong woman 
exemplar before completing a measure of implicit 
stereotypes. 
 
 
C 
 
 
Prevent stereotype expression 
 
 
 
Teach participants to say “no” when encountering 
stereotypic stimulus combinations before measuring 
their implicit gender stereotypes. 
 
Stereo-   
   type 
 
Stereo-
type 
 
Stereo-
type On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     41      
 
 Table 3 
Analysis of Categorical Moderators Using a Random Effects Model 
Moderator variable 
with respective levels 
QB  QW  k  Hedges’ g  SE of g  p of g 
Publication status 
    Published 
    Unpublished 
8.76
** 19.91 
14.20 
5.71
 
 
 
 
11 
10
 
 
 
 
.55 
.14 
 
.010 
.09 
 
< .001 
.124 
 
 
 
First author 
    Female 
    Male 
  .16  20.95 
19.02 
1.93
 
 
 
 
15 
6
 
 
 
 
.35 
.28 
 
.09 
.17 
 
< .001 
.101 
 
 
 
Nationality of sample
a 
    US 
    Europe 
5.14
* 20.14 
13.89 
6.25
 
 
 
 
11 
9
 
 
 
 
.48 
.14 
 
.10 
.11 
 
< .001 
.216 
 
 
 
Intervention specificity 
    Both 
    Female only 
  .10  20.74 
9.15 
11.58
 
 
 
 
7 
14
 
 
 
 
.30 
.36 
 
.14 
.10 
 
.036 
< .001 
 
 
 
Type of intervention
b 
    Distraction 
    Heterogeneity 
    Suppression 
6.34
* 16.06 
.71 
14.55 
.81
 
 
 
 
 
4 
11 
5
 
 
 
 
 
.43 
.46 
.00 
 
.18 
.09 
.16 
 
.020 
< .001 
.983 
 
 
 
 
Indirect measure
c 
    IAT 
    GNAT 
    Priming 
    LDT 
1.39 14.65 
7.55 
.30 
6.51 
.28
 
 
 
 
 
9 
2 
4 
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
.41 
.13 
.40 
.51 
 
.11 
.24 
.20 
.24 
 
< .001 
.580 
.042 
.035 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. QB = between-groups Q statistic; QW = total within-groups Q statistic for moderator variable and separate Q statistic for each group. 
aDue to insufficient sample size from non-US and non-European countries, the study by Nodera and Karasawa (2005) had to be excluded from this 
analysis. On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     42      
 
bStudy 4 of Blair et al. (2001) reported effect sizes for both heterogeneity and suppression manipulations. Because these effect sizes used the same 
sample in the control condition and were thus partly dependent, only the effect size for the suppression condition was entered into this analysis. 
cWe only included indirect measures in this analysis that were employed in at least two primary studies. 
*p < .05 (two-tailed). 
**p < .01.On the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotypes     43      
 
Figure 1. Scree plot of sample-adjusted meta-analytic deviancy (SAMD) values. 
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